1. The resilience literature often assumes that social-ecological reorganization will result in either the removal of deficient system elements (components, interactions) or social learning. Major perturbations are expected to lead to either adaptation or, if accompanied by a regime shift, transformation. This has led to a conflation of the concepts of resilience and adaptation, which has in turn made it difficult to quantitatively distinguish between cases in which a system returned to a previous state, and adaptation or learning occurred, and cases in which the system was resilient but adaptation or learning did not occur. 2. We used a network analysis of nine years of ostrich movement data to explore the socialecological resilience of the Western Cape ostrich industry, which nearly collapsed following an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza in 2011 and has gradually rebuilt. 3. The system that emerged following the outbreak contained fewer farms but was more connected than at any period prior to the outbreak. As system reorganization proceeded, network traits began to fluctuate seasonally and to approach values similar to those observed prior to the outbreak. It was estimated that it would take 4-5 full seasonal cycles for the system to return to a similar state to that prior to the disease outbreak. In other words, although the system reorganized following the system collapse, it remained within the same regime and showed no obvious evidence of adaptation or learning. 4. Policy implications. The majority of previous work on studying system response to disturbance has focused on outcome-based adaptation and learning. This study highlights the need to understand systems that respond to disturbance without learning or adaptation. Network analysis offers a useful quantitative tool for exploring social-ecological resilience and tracking changes in vulnerability. However, the development of better ways of incorporating additional data from multiple scales into network analysis remains an important priority for improving the predictive power and policy relevance of network approaches to analysing resilience.
Introduction
The relationships between biodiversity, ecological complexity and the stability of animal and plant communities have been focal points for theoretical development in ecology for nearly half a century. Following seminal added further impetus to this particular research theme (e.g. Dunne & Williams 2009; Estes et al. 2011 ). Since Holling's (1969 Holling's ( , 1973 closely related discussion of the importance of system resilience in sustainable resource management, many of the same concepts have also become highly influential in the study of linked systems of people and nature (social-ecological systems or SESs).
There are many different stability concepts in ecology, and concepts are often used in different ways, making it particularly important for quantitative analysis that the stability-related system property of interest is clearly defined and appropriately measured (Grimm, Schmidt & Wissel 1992) and operationalized in relation to a particular set of state variables and stressors (Carpenter et al. 2001) . Resilience is a higher-level, emergent property of a system that was originally defined as the time it took to return to a stable local equilibrium (Pimm 1984) . Pimm (1984) considered that resilience did not apply to unstable systems. Contemporary usage has broadened the concept of resilience to define it as a system's ability to cope with change while remaining in the same regime (Carpenter et al. 2001) or, effectively, to retain its identity (Cumming & Collier 2005) . In other words, resilience is currently understood to describe the ability of a complex system more generally to remain within a particular local attractor (system state), whether through homeostatic mechanisms or adaptation.
In social-ecological systems research, resilience to perturbations is often equated with being able to learn from mistakes and to respond effectively to changes in the local or global environment (Adger et al. 2005; Krasny, Lundholm & Plummer 2010) . The currently understood relationship of resilience to learning and adaptation can, however, create contradictions for quantitative analysis. If people learn from their mistakes, then they should respond to perturbations in ways that make the system more resilient to similar future perturbations. Their responses may involve actively changing the identity of the system in such a way that an analyst who was only measuring relevant indicator variables would conclude that the system was not resilient, in the sense that it has neither returned to a local equilibrium nor remained in the same regime. In current usage, being resilient thus involves not being too resilient.
From an analytical perspective, some subtle distinctions must be made before we can understand what quantifying resilience means. First, a system may appear to be resilient (i.e. may experience a major perturbation and return quite quickly to its former state) without adapting or even possessing adaptive capacity. Secondly, if a system has a very high adaptive capacity (defined as its ability to self-organize and adjust in response to perturbations), then purely quantitative analysis will not necessarily identify it as being resilient in the sense of 'retaining the same structure, function, and controls' (Carpenter et al. 2001) . The challenge in this second instance is to distinguish quantitatively between rapid, flexible adaptationwhich would generally be desirable in an SESand changes in system state that are due to collapse or degradation. These may be quantitatively similar but qualitatively very different. For example, a decline in the area of farmed land might imply looming famine or simply a shift to a more intensive farming system. The ability of a socialecological system to enter a new state has also been called its transformability (Walker et al. 2004) , and in social contexts where adaptation and learning can occur, transformation provides a potentially useful counterpoint to resilience. Thirdly, a system may simply have a lot of inertia and be difficult to perturb. Technically, this behaviour is better defined as 'resistant' (Pimm 1984) than 'resilient', particularly if the system shows no sign of returning to a local equilibrium. Distinguishing quantitatively between different outcomes in an analysis of a system's response (or predicted response) to a perturbation requires (i) a clear definition of what 'the system' is (i.e. its identity; Cumming & Collier 2005) and (ii) measurement of one or more relevant, analytically tractable variables that can capture changes in system properties of interest, as related to a given perturbation. In reality, there is a continuum of possible responses to disturbance, and quantitative diagnosis will be particularly important around the midpoint of this continuum where cases are not qualitatively clear-cut.
We use a detailed case study of the dynamics of an animal production system, comparing system structure before and after a major perturbation (in the form of a pathogen outbreak), to provide a quantitative test of the operationality of the conceptual distinctions that we have outlined. The post-outbreak economic recovery of the ostrich industry proves that it is still achieving its primary goal: the production and marketing of ostrich products. It has therefore demonstrated some evidence of a return to a local equilibrium and its ability to maintain its core function. We hypothesized that the ostrich industry might have achieved recovery either (H1) through being flexible and adaptive, with new approaches to ostrich rearing that minimize disease risks being developed; (H2) through there being sufficiently many farmers still in business post-outbreak for the industry to be resilient without adapting, in the sense of gradually returning to normality without substantive changes in ostrich rearing practices; or (H3) by finding a way to achieve economic goals through even greater connectivity, counter-intuitively increasing its vulnerability to disease. We chose to test these hypotheses by constructing a movement network of birds between farms using a network analysis approach as it allows for multiple features of structure to be observed over time via network metrics. In each case, we were interested in whether we could detect properties of the movement network that showed evidence of changes in adaptive capacity and/or resilience. Specifically, we predicted that if H1 were correct, steps should have been actively taken to reduce the length of potential infection chains by reducing connectivity (density and degree distribution), increasing the number of farms a disease would have to travel through to reach all farms (network diameter), and aspects of independent clusters of farms (increasing the number of clusters and decreasing the size of largest cluster). These changes would signify an adaptive response that we would expect to lead to an increase in overall resilience to H5N2 in the ostrich movement network (Moore et al. 2014) . Conversely, H2 would be supported by a gradual return to pre-outbreak conditions and H3 by increases beyond pre-outbreak conditions in the same network metrics. In addition to demonstrating the need to separate the elements of return time and adaptation in quantitative analyses of resilience, our analysis also highlights both the strengths and limitations of using network analysis to measure social-ecological resilience.
Materials and methods

S T U D Y S Y S T E M B A C K G R O U N D
The data set used for this study was drawn from the ostrich industry of the Western Cape of South Africa. The industry produces ostriches primarily for fresh meat to export to European markets, for leather and for feathers. The production process from hatching to slaughter typically takes 12-14 months, with birds going to slaughter when they reach 70-90 kg. Ostriches are vulnerable to climatic extremes (e.g. low temperatures or heavy rain), so in order to maximize ostrich survival, farms specialize in one (or more) life stages: breeding and hatching, chick rearing, subadult rearing and adult rearing. As a result, individual ostriches are moved up to four times before slaughter (Moore et al. 2014 ). These movements have historically been unregulated and farms can specialize in more than one stage of the production process (e.g. a hatchery can also be an adult rearing facility).
In recent years, the growing threat of disease and the need to cater to the demands of the European market have led to the introduction of a permit system for bird movements. After avian influenza outbreaks during 2004 and 2006, the industry returned to production levels experienced prior to the 2004 outbreak during the 2009-2010 season, with just over 260 000 ostriches slaughtered during this period (South African Ostrich Business Chamber, pers. comm. 2014). Both outbreaks occurred on a limited number of farms and geographical areas and had much shorter export suspension bans associated with them than the outbreak analysed in this study where export bans are still in place in 2015. While production impacts were seen immediately after 2006, the movement network had stabilized by 2011 (South African Ostrich Business Chamber, pers. comm. 2015; Moore et al. 2014) .
In April 2011, the ostrich industry suffered a major perturbation from an outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza (HPAI). In order to contain the outbreak of this highly contagious and potentially zoonotic disease, an eradication policy (slaughter of all birds) was undertaken on all HPAI-positive farms. Moore et al. (2014) found strong supporting evidence that the disease was transmitted between farms by the movement of infected ostriches, rather than alternative transmission pathways (e.g. people or wild birds).
During the outbreak, movement of birds was restricted and the export industry was voluntarily shut down. After 5 months, the outbreak was considered contained, and in September 2011, ostrich movements returned to relative normality outside the containment zone. This period is known as the post-core outbreak period, due to restrictions remaining within the containment zone until March 2012. Initial exploratory analysis did not indicate a significant shift in system properties directly after the end of the post-core outbreak period, so we will refer to the entire period of observation following the containment of H5N2, including movements before and after March 2012, as the post-outbreak period. Fewer farms existed after the outbreak as a result of the impact of the outbreak and there were some changes in the regulations associated with the farming of ostriches in South Africa, with some larger farmers buying out smaller farmers, who were forced out of business. A more comprehensive summary of the 2011 outbreak and its immediate consequences can be found in Abolnik et al. (2012) and Moore et al. (2014) .
D A T A S E T S
The South African Ostrich Business Chamber (SAOBC) provided bird movement records for both pre-and post-outbreak periods. These records included information about the source and target farms of the movement, the number of birds moved and the date the movement occurred. In developing the network, farms were represented as nodes, and movements were represented as edges.
The data were divided into two separate data sets: a pre-outbreak data set and a post-outbreak data set. The pre-outbreak data set consisted of all movements between the introduction of permit tracking and the month prior to the outbreak (September 2005-March 2011, n Months = 67). During the outbreak (April-August 2011), ostrich movements were restricted and irregular. As a result, the data are unreliable and were excluded from the analysis. The post-outbreak data set consisted of all movements between the lifting of the movement ban (outside of the containment zone) associated with the outbreak September 2011 and March 2014 (i.e. September 2011 to March 2014, n Months = 31).
N E T W O R K M E T R I C S
Network analysis is most effectively used to assess a single scale, and choosing the scale of analysis for a network study must reflect the scale of perturbation as well as hypothesized adaptation. Due to the movement of birds as the primary mode of disease transmission and the regional impact of the outbreak, we chose to conduct our analysis at the regional scale. It is possible that adaptation(s) could also occur at scales above or below this scale; however, our analysis is restricted due to the current capabilities of the method, and a lack of data at the farm scale.
To quantify changes in network metrics over time, subnetworks were generated for each month. This scale of temporal observation was coarse enough to measure changes in network metrics, yet fine enough to detect subtle changes over time. We tracked the total number of birds moved each month as an indication of activity within the system. While pre-movement avian influenza surveillance is performed at the flock level, an increasing number of movements over time increases the probability of this surveillance failing to detect disease. Other network metrics chosen for this study were identified by Moore et al. (2014) as suitable for observing potential changes in vulnerability over time. They included density, number of weak components and the size of a giant component (Table 1) . These measures give an indication of potential speed of transmission or connectedness of the network (density), the number of non-interacting clusters of farms (weak components) as well as how many farms are contained in the largest cluster (size of giant component). If a monthly network has a high number of realized movements, a small number of non-interacting clusters of which one is disproportionally large, and a highly pathogenic disease is introduced at random to the network, the impact of a disease could be high. When considered together, these measures indicate the potential scope of disease spread in any given month. Persistent changes in these metrics following the outbreak would be indicative of an adaptive response to the disease perturbation. Further description of the relevance of these specific metrics can be found in Moore et al. (2014) .
We also included network diameter as a measure of how quickly a disease could infect the entire network. Network diameter indicates the maximal number of edges separating the two most distant nodes (Boccaletti et al. 2006) . Network diameter provides a rough indication of network efficiency (Balconi, Breschi & Lissoni 2004) , and in reference to disease, it may denote the potential rapidity of pathogen spread.
While density gives an indication of the connectivity of a network, it does not indicate how homogeneous or heterogeneous this connectivity is across nodes. The presence of a node (or multiple nodes) with a disproportionately high level of connectedness has significant implications for disease spread. These nodes, also termed hubs, are more susceptible to infection and have a very high potential to spread pathogens. A useful analogy is to consider international airports, where Heathrow Airport in London is considered a hub because of its disproportionally high numbers of ingoing and outgoing connections. In order to determine how heterogeneous network connectivity is, we calculated degree distribution. The degree of each node indicates how many movements, or connections, it has in a given network (and in our case, in a given month). The distribution of the degree values in a network (i.e. the number of nodes with a degree of one, two, three, etc.) indicates how heterogeneous connectivity is in the network. When a regression is run on this distribution, if the slope of the line is between two and three, the network is said to be scale-free (Barabasi, Albert & Jeong 2000) . Many real-world networks have been shown to display similar scale-free architectures, where the heterogeneity of connectivity is consistent, regardless of network scope, size or function (Barabasi 2009 ). Scale-free networks are regarded as potentially more vulnerable to pathogen outbreaks (Pastor-satorras & Vespignani 2001) . Degree distribution is particularly important to consider as it can give an indication of network function as related to disease vulnerability.
Network analysis traditionally compares the real-world network of interest to a random network that is generated using one of a number of different algorithms, such as the Erd} os-R enyi model (Erdos & R enyi 1961; Hanneman & Riddle 2005) . A significant difference between actual and random networks may suggest self-organization, which may indicate that each node is reachable via a small number of steps, or a hyper-connected node or hub (tending towards scale-free). Within the context of disease transmission, this could indicate an increase in vulnerability of the network to disease spread or outbreak.
We generated random networks for each monthly network using the Erd} os-R enyi model in the R package igraph (Csardi & Nepusz 2006) . This algorithm uses the actual number of nodes and edges to generate a random network of the same size as the real network but edges randomly distributed between nodes. Higher density is associated with higher vulnerability. A greater number of movements could cause an increase in potential transmission speed through the network. Network Diameter † The maximal number of edges separating the two most distant nodes.
A small network diameter suggests that even the most distant farms are quite close to one another, suggesting a lack of compartmentalization, and a higher epidemic potential. Number of Weak Components* The number of completely independent groups within a network. In a weak component, ties are considered bidirectional and indicate connectivity.
Fewer components signal higher interconnectedness of all nodes in the network. This increases the chance that if disease (or disturbance) is introduced at random, it has a higher potential to impact a greater proportion of the network.
Size of Giant Component* The giant component is the independent component with the highest proportion of nodes in the network.
A large giant component indicates that if disease (or disturbance) was introduced to the network, there is a higher probability that it would happen in the giant component and would also have the potential to impact a greater proportion of the network. Degree Distribution*
The degree of a node is the number of connections it has to other nodes. The degree distribution can reveal random or complex self-organized network connectivity patterns.
The degree distribution of a random network will follow a normal distribution. A more vulnerable network would likely have a degree distribution which follows a reverse exponential curve. This indicates the presence of more connected nodes, thereby introducing vulnerability. If these more connected nodes, or hubs, become infected, the epidemic potential of an outbreak increases.
Since random and real networks have the same proportion of edges to nodes, densities for these networks are identical.
To investigate whether the ostrich movement network demonstrated self-organization at any time, Wilcoxon's signedrank tests were used to determine whether the network metrics were significantly different to those of the corresponding random network (P value < 0Á05). For each monthly time step (n Months = 99, excluding April 2011-August 2011), 1000 random networks were created and network metrics were calculated from each.
P R E -O U T B R E A K A N D P O S T -O U T B R E A K C O M P A R I S O N
Parameters identified in the previous step of analysis as significantly different than what is expected in a random network were identified as displaying some self-organizing or complex nonrandom behaviour. In order to assess the impact of the outbreak on these parameters and the network structure and function that they represent, these parameters were tested to identify whether there were significant differences before and after the outbreak. Because the sampling period prior to the outbreak was more than twice as long as the period after the outbreak (pre-outbreak, n Months = 67; post-outbreak, n Months = 31), the pre-outbreak period was divided into two subsets, covering the same progression of months as the post-outbreak (September 2011-March 2014, n Months = 31). These were termed the early pre-outbreak period (September 2005-March 2008, n Months = 31) and the late pre-outbreak period (September 2008-March 2011, n Months = 31). Additionally, as observed by Moore et al. (2014) in an analysis of the pre-outbreak period, this method allowed a range of predictions to be generated. Generalized linear models (GLMs) of network properties against time were used to describe trends in the data and to determine whether there were significant differences between the distribution of network metrics in the early pre-outbreak period and the post-outbreak period, and in the late pre-outbreak period and the post-outbreak period, respectively.
R E L A T I V E M E A S U R E S A N D H A L F -L I V E S
We determined the relative differences for those metrics that were identified during the GLM analysis as being significantly different across all periods. We first logged all values to decrease the influence of seasonality on the system. The post-outbreak monthly metric values were then subtracted from the early and late pre-outbreak values to determine the relative difference. Regressions of these resulting trends against time were then conducted. To determine the approximate amount of time that it would take for the post-outbreak values to return to the preoutbreak values (based on observed changes in the post-outbreak period), the half-life of the slope of the regression was used to make temporal predictions. We predicted that those parameters with sufficiently large half-life values would not approach pre-outbreak levels of vulnerability, with the expectation that such outcomes would indicate that adaptation or transformation had taken place.
Results
Based on the dynamics of the ostrich movement network, the avian influenza outbreak clearly acted as a major perturbation, with approximately a third of farms dropping out of the network. While there were fewer participating farms following the outbreak, the number of farms participating each year after the outbreak gradually increased. There were 318 farms active during October 2010, the largest and most active network observed prior to the outbreak. During October 2011 (the first records from October following the outbreak), the network comprised only 102 farms, increasing to 112 in October 2012 and 153 in October 2013 (Fig. 2) . These numbers might be taken to indicate either that the network was still growing or that the system was fundamentally altered. Our results indicated that while structurally different, the ostrich production system was still functionally similar to its pre-outbreak state, particularly in regard to its potential vulnerabilities and resilience.
N E T W O R K M E T R I C S
Ostrich movements were initially much reduced following the outbreak of HPAI. Prior to the outbreak, the number of active farms per month varied between 176 and 303 in the first year (2005) (2006) and between 111 and 313 during the year prior to the outbreak (2010-2011) (Fig. 1) . After the outbreak, the number of farms participating in the network decreased, varying between 46 and 126 farms (2011) (2012) . However, available data from the post-outbreak period indicated that the number of participating nodes in the network was increasing over time. Using October, the busiest month pre-outbreak, as a benchmark, the number of nodes grew by approximately 9% between 2011 and 2012 and a further 27% between 2012 and 2013. The number of movements was also reduced following the outbreak (Fig. 2) . The substantial increase in network density following the outbreak indicates that the network was more connected following the outbreak (Fig. 3) ; the density in the months with the least activity was higher than any recorded prior to the outbreak (Fig. 3) .
D E T E R M I N I N G N E T W O R K T Y P E : C O M P A R I N G R E A L A N D R A N D O M N E T W O R K S
Degree distribution and the size of the giant component were significantly higher in both the pre-and post-outbreak time periods than in random networks (P < 0Á001). Network diameter, path length and number of weak components were significantly lower in both the pre-and post-outbreak time periods than in random networks (P < 0Á001).
P R E -O U T B R E A K A N D P O S T -O U T B R E A K C O M P A R I S O N
The general linear models revealed that there was no significant difference between both the degree distribution and the number of weak components between the preand post-outbreak periods. Number of birds moved, size of the giant component and network diameter were all significantly different between the pre-and post-outbreak periods.
R E L A T I V E M E A S U R E S A N D H A L F -L I V E S
The number of birds being moved was increasing following the outbreak (Fig. 4a) . The cumulative number of birds being moved per year increased from 11 316 birds in 2011 to 34 954 birds in 2012 and 44 560 birds in 2013. The relative difference in movement numbers decreased between both early and late pre-outbreak values and post-outbreak values (Fig. 4b) . The estimated half-life was between 14Á5 and 17Á7 months (Table 2) . Based on these values, it is expected that the number of birds being moved will reach 90% of the pre-outbreak values within 48Á2-58Á7 months or 4Á0-4Á9 years.
The size of the giant component increased after the outbreak. The relative difference decreased between both early and late pre-outbreak values and the post-outbreak values (Fig. 4b) . The estimated half-life was 10Á0 and 12Á6 months (Table 2) . Based on these values, it is expected that the size of the giant component will reach 90% of the pre-outbreak values within 33Á4-41Á9 months or 2Á8-3Á5 years.
The network diameter increased after the outbreak. The relative difference decreased between both early and late preoutbreak values and the post-outbreak values (Fig. 4c) . The estimated half-life was 17Á6 and 26Á4 months (Table 2) . Based on these values, it is expected that the network diameter will reach 90% of the pre-outbreak values within 58Á6-87Á6 months or 4Á9-7Á3 years.
Discussion
Our results provide strong support for our second hypothesis, namely that the ostrich movement network appears to have been resilient (in the sense of being able to return quite quickly to its former state) in the absence of adaptation. There was no evidence for active attempts to reduce network properties that would increase the resilience of the network to pathogen outbreaks, nor any concrete evidence of maladaptive responses that might increase network vulnerability, although the density of the system after the outbreak was significantly higher than the density prior to the outbreak (Fig. 3) . While the number of active farms had decreased, the number of movements significantly increased. There were two disproportionally active months post-outbreak during August and September 2012, with densities of 0Á02 and 0Á018, respectively. Rather than interpreting these as evidence for short-term maladaptation, it is important to note that a number of factors may have contributed to this discrepancy. First, new guidelines for farm registration were introduced in July 2012. These guidelines, described as part of a South African Government Veterinary Procedural Notice (VPN), were under review for a substantial period of time and inhibited farmers from registering new farms during the review process. Additionally, climatic factors dictate the seasonal stages of ostrich production and the July-September period coincides with the typical season start for most breeders. Many farmers with newly registered farms were eager to acquire chicks as soon as possible (P. Kleyn pers. Comm., Mather & Marshall 2010) . Finally, a shift in market value of ostrich leather and feathers could have further contributed to a stark increase in network movements (P. Kleyn pers. comm.). The number of weak components and the degree distribution following the outbreak did not differ significantly (in statistical terms) from pre-outbreak levels. One might have expected all metrics to follow similar trajectories of change or adaptation following a major perturbation. Our results indicated that this was not so; the degree distribution appeared to be particularly important for understanding network structure. Other metrics, such as the number of components, may be influenced by network size (which was smaller post-outbreak). However, coupled with the similarity of degree distribution between the preand post-outbreak time periods, these metrics could act as suitable initial signals of adaptation, or a lack of it.
Network diameter, size of the giant component and the number of birds being moved were statistically significantly different after the outbreak. However, the difference between the pre-and post-outbreak values of these metrics grew smaller in each successive year. Although the 'new' system has fewer farms, the increase in movement activity following the outbreak will allow the industry to return to previous export levels. Further, the rapid return of the giant component's size to pre-outbreak values was surprising. One would expect that a network with fewer nodes would have a smaller giant component than a network with more nodes. The discrepancy could possibly be due to a smaller number of options of where to move birds, resulting in an increased likelihood that trades will happen with the same farms. Alternatively, the larger farms that worked together prior to the outbreak probably continued to do so after it. Many smaller farms also went out of business due to the outbreak, and in some cases, these properties were purchased by existing larger farms. So, this increased integration may be an artefact of farmers with multiple properties using the same trading partners for all of their properties, rather than increased integration of separate farm owners. Network diameter increased in the period following the outbreak. The resulting trend could be potentially misleading, and it is difficult to draw conclusions about this metric.
L E S S O N S F O R U N D E R S T A N D I N G B R O A D E R R E S I L I E N C E A N D A D A P T A T I O N
Looking beyond the details of changes in this system, our analysis demonstrates several important principles for the quantitative analysis of system resilience in real-world situations. Quantifying attributes of the network that were relevant to the spread of disease was an important and necessary step in the analysis, but tracking changes in these attributes through a major perturbation was not sufficient on its own to quantify changes in resilience. The ostrich movement network itself survived the crisis, and it appeared by the end of our time period of analysis to be rapidly recovering and self-organizing along the same trajectory as before. At the regional scale of analysis, it had clearly been through a cycle of increase and collapse, but without adaptation or significant reorganization. When considering only the regional scale, it is assumed that another outbreak of highly pathogenic avian influenza could in theory spread through the movement network just as rapidly as before. Our analysis provides evidence that no network-level steps have been taken to guard against this very real possibility.
Further investigation, however, indicates that the government has imposed adaptive measures. These measures have been implemented at the farm level and were not detectable by our analysis due to a scale mismatch between the analysis and the intervention. A revised Veterinary Procedural Notice (VPN) protocol, which is aimed at aiding biosecurity and containment of avian influenza on individual farms, was introduced in July 2012. These regulations dictate that farms must keep new birds separate from the rest of the farm for at least 28 days, which is enough time for birds to display symptoms of influenza. Additionally, post-movement testing for avian influenza has been introduced to add to pre-movement testing (which was the only requirement prior to the 2011 HPAI outbreak). The potential for adaptation at other geographical scales or institutional levels highlights one of the major difficulties of using network analysis to quantify dynamics relating to vulnerability and resilience in complex systems. Social-ecological systems are by nature multi-scale and complex, dictating that analytical approaches must consider these factors. Studies of networks in SESs tend to focus on a single scale and level of analysis, and this example shows that more effort must be made in the future to integrate the quantitative analysis of hierarchies with that of networks.
Our results suggest that the regional network lacked adaptive capacity and hence was resilient (in a classical sense) but neither resilient (in a contemporary sense) nor open to transformation. In other words, the system was (and is) resilient only in a classical sense of returning to a local equilibrium. We found no quantitative evidence of learning or adaptation at our level of analysis in regard to the movements of ostriches within the network. We note in passing that the axis of 'capital' that has been previously proposed for the adaptive cycle (Holling & Gunderson 2002) was useful in drawing this distinction.
To the best of our knowledge, there are few quantitative analyses of social-ecological systems in which learning and adaptation have not occurred after a major perturbation. Failures to learn, and failures to build resilience following a potential learning experience, are nonetheless cited as a common problem in natural resource management (Hilborn 1992; Berkes 2009; Grantham et al. 2009 ). Most case study analyses have focused on understanding positive, transformative events because of the potential insights that they offer into finding solutions for resource management problems (Olsson, Folke & Hahn 2004; Chapin et al. 2010) . Our analysis suggests that research on the dark side of the problem, a failure to learn or to build resilience following a perturbation, can also be a valuable source of insights into the mechanisms that underpin resilience as well as for the further conceptual development and operationalization of concepts relating to the stability of complex systems. These insights are, in turn, fundamental for both the further growth of the discipline of sustainability science and the development of capability to predict (and respond proactively to warnings of) social-ecological collapse.
